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AGREEING TO DISAGREE: A BALANCED
SOLUTION TO WHETHER PARTIES MAY
CONTRACT FOR EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW
BEYOND THE FAA
ANTHONY J. LONGO*

INTRODUCTION

The silver-haired Kingsfieldian' Contracts professor surveys a full
room of nervous Harts 2 and minds and asks a simple question, "Why do
people make contracts? '' 3 After an uncomfortable silence, the Professor
offers uncharacteristic help. "People enter into contracts because they all
want the same thing out of life. Tell me what that one thing is. ' '4 After a few5
sporadic and unsatisfactory answers, the Professor simply answers, "more."
Everybody wants "more;" the essential nature of contract law is to
provide a system of controls for parties as they pursue "more. '" 6 To get
* Anthony J. Longo is a dual degree student at The John Marshall Law School earning his
Juris Doctor and Master of Laws in Information Technology and Privacy Law. Anthony is
currently Managing Editor of the The Law Review, clerks for an aviation law firm, and is
a research assistant to Professor Celeste Hammond. Anthony is also a former judicial
extem for the Honorable Julia Nowicki in the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court for
Cook County. I wish to thank the Editorial Board for the wonderful work they put into
this article; Professor Hammond for her amazing guidance; Alex Herran, Esquire for his
help and understanding; and my comrades: Michael Roberts, Tony Perrelli, Dane Loizzo,
Aaron Lunt and Chad Sabora. You are all true gentlemen. Above all, I thank my mother,
Christine, and two sisters, Laura and Marian, for spoiling me with their love ... sine qua
non.
1 THE PAPER CHASE (20th Century Fox 1973). John Houseman won an Academy
Award (Best Supporting Actor) for his portrayal of an intimidating Contracts professor in
this 1973 movie classic.
2. Id. Timothy Bottoms played Hart, the terrified Contracts student.
3. Professor Leonard Jay Shrager, Contracts Lecture at The John Marshall Law
School (Apr. 15, 2002).
4. Id.
5. Id
6. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269,
272-74 (1986) (asserting that one purpose of contract law is to impose responsibility on
promisors). See also Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799
(1941) (asserting that contract law should follow certain formalities; these formalities will
foster individual liberty, private autonomy, and freedom of transaction in the private
sector, but will be subject to minimum controls by courts who should support promisors
and promisees who exercise their freedom to contract). See also CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 7-28 (1981)
(asserting that contract law is vital to upholding moral conduct by upholding the sanctity
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"more", a contracting party offers something it has in exchange for
something it wants. 7 Both parties in a contractual transaction want what they
are getting "more" than what they are giving up. 8 This desire for "more" is
currently at the center of a split between several federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals. 9
A.

The Issue

Contracting parties to pre-dispute arbitration clauses have begun asking
the courts to do more. 10
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses have been
historically utilized, since the enactment of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), to contractually bind two or more commercial parties to arbitration
in lieu of traditional litigation, if a dispute arose from their commercial
relationship." Recently, however, lawyers have used pre-dispute arbitration
clauses to demand more from the arbitration process and the federal district
court system. Lawyers have taken a more active drafting role by inserting
judicial review expansion clauses into the pre-dispute arbitration contract
itself.
The notion that lawyers knowingly advise commercial clients to sign a
contract to arbitrate, where that contract arguably ignores a federal statute the
contract relies on, may cause one to raise a legal eyebrow in contempt.' 2 The
eyebrow settles somewhat, however, when one remembers that the parties
would not have binding arbitration pursuant to the FAA available to them
without that contract; what the parties agree to in the contract, even if it is an
agreement to supplement the governing statute, is thus not so contemptuous.
This heightened review is in addition to and beyond the limited scope of
judicial review provided in the FAA.' 3 To illustrate, a demand commonly

of the promise).

PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

(1979) (examining the history of contract law from the English common law to the failure
of classic contract theory).

7. See Lecture, supra note 3 (explaining that individuals value what they are
receiving under a contract more than what they are giving up).

8. Id.
9. Kevin A. Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIs U. L.J.

509, 510 (2002).
10. See Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501,
1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that despite the plaintiffs desire to have an arbitration
award reviewed by a court of law, parties "cannot contract for judicial review of that
award;" Judge Posner implied that such expanded review of arbitration awards was outside
the job of the courts, and that the parties could rather contract for an appellate arbitration
panel to review the award instead).
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
12. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality
Through FunctionalAnalysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 128-29 (2002) (arguing that the root
cause for parties succeeding in contractually expanding the scope of judicial review is the
court's inattention to the literal and functional meaning of finality in the governing

statute).
13. Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in
ArbitrationAgreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395, 398-400 (1998).
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inserted into pre-dispute arbitration clauses is that the arbitration award 14
must be reviewed
by a federal district judge for arbitrator error in applying
5
the rule of law.'
B.

The FAA Offers No JudicialReview For Errorsin Applying the Law

Commercial arbitration awards under the FAA 16 are not subject to a
statutorily mandated review for errors of law.' 7 Rather, the FAA maintains
only four limited grounds for vacatur that a party may pursue, in a federal
district court, if dissatisfied with the arbitrator's decision.' 8 In other words,
the losing party at arbitration can use the FAA to ask a federal district court
to vacate the arbitration award, but that party will succeed only if one of the

14. See Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (commenting that arbitrators are not required, nor should they be
required, to explain the reasoning behind an arbitration award because such a rule would
undermine the quickness, efficiency and informality of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation).
15. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 242. The contracting parties inserted the following
contractual language expanding the scope of judicial review:
Upon an application to the court for an order confirming said award, the court shall
have the power to review (1) whether the findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator
are, on the entire record of said arbitration proceedings, supported by substantial
evidence, and (2) whether as a matter of law based on said findings of fact the
award should be affirmed, modified or vacated. Upon such determination, judgment
shall be entered in favor of either party consistent therewith.
Id.
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
17. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 331, 346-47 (1996) (noting that even when the violation of law is egregious, the
FAA does not mandate judicial review of the arbitration award for errors of law). See also
Brandeis Intsel Ltd. V. Calabrian Chem. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(reminding the parties that a foreign arbitration award is at issue which further restricts the
reasoning behind reviewing arbitration awards for legal error); TOM CARBONNEAU, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

260 (1997) (arguing the judicial review

on the merits of the law was never contemplated under the FAA, in fact, such a review is
antithetical to the statute).
18. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (setting forth the grounds under which a federal district court
can vacate an arbitration award). This statute, in allowing vacatur of an arbitration award,
states the following:
(a) In any of the following cases, the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party may have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
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four FAA listed grounds were violated.1 9 Briefly, these four grounds are (1)
partiality; 22 (3)
arbitrator corruption, fraud 20 or undue means; 21 (2) evident
24
23
power.
of
misuse
(4)
and
misconduct or misbehavior;
19. Id.
20. See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that to warrant vacation of arbitration award for fraud, "the movant must
establish the fraud by clear and convincing evidence," "the fraud must not have been
discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence prior to or during arbitration," and "the
person seeking to vacate the award must demonstrate that the fraud materially related to an
issue in arbitration," but the movant is not required to prove that result of proceedings
would have been different absent the fraud).
21. See Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 108-09 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (reasoning that "'undue means' requires some type of bad faith in procurement of
the [arbitration] award" and does not apply to allegations regarding evidence presented at
an arbitration proceeding "without any specific allegations that there was bad faith, fraud,
or corruption as to such evidence"). ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C. Inc., 173 F.3d
493, 497 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding there to be no basis to vacate an arbitration award when
the arbitrator failed to disclose his law firm's association with a customer of one of the
provided no basis for vacation
parties in dispute, because the association, in and of itself,
due to the triviality of the relationship, even though undisclosed).
See also Local Union 1160 v. Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., 616 F. Supp. 812, 814 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (holding that allegations of "undue means," specifically that the defendant
intimidated one of its witnesses, is insufficient to vacate an arbitration award where the
arbitrator did not accord substantial weight to the witness's testimony).
22. See Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., 280 F.3d 815, 821 (8th Cir.
2001) (reasoning that since "parties to an arbitration choose their method of dispute
resolution, [they] can ask [for] no more impartiality than inheres in the method they have
chosen"). See also Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Serv. 146
F.3d 1309, 1311-12 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that an arbitrator is not guilty of"evident
partiality" merely because evidence surfaces of past business contacts between his
employer and an interested party, absent actual knowledge of real or potential conflict of
interest); Int'l Produce v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1981) (reasoning that
the standard of "evident partiality," which would authorize vacating an arbitration award
due to bias of the arbitrator, is not made out by mere appearance of bias); Standard
Tankers Co. v. Motor Tank Vessel, Akti, 438 F. Supp. 153, 160 (E.D.N.C. 1977)
(commenting that to constitute evident partiality "some overt misconduct or demonstration
of partiality is required," and a court would not vacate an arbitration award where a
reading of the arbitrator's opinion filed in support of his vote "show[ed] that it [was] based
on reason and fact and, accordingly, [could] not be characterized as evidently partial").
23. See, e.g., Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Local 1115 Joint Bd., 377 F. Supp.
1208, 1213-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding arbitrator misbehavior or misconduct when
arbitrator was clearly aware of a legitimate and serious illness of a party's key witness, but
still refused to grant the requested adjournment). Seldner Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 22
F. Supp. 388, 392-93 (D. Md. 1938) (finding misconduct or misbehavior prejudicing the
plaintiff where the arbitrators failed to give notice regarding the time and place of the
arbitration hearing, thus restricting timely submission of relevant evidence); See Totem
Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. N. Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1979)
(finding that an ex partereceipt of evidence by the arbitrators bearing on the amount of the
award to be made amounted to misbehavior or misconduct). See also Agarwal v. Agarwal,
775 F. Supp. 588, 590-91 (E.D.N.Y 1991) (holding that an arbitrator's award will not be
vacated under the FAA for his misconduct in failing to postpone a hearing, where the
arbitration losers had already once postponed hearing and represented that they would not
seek any further adjournment, even though the losing party's counsel subsequently
withdrew from representing them in the arbitration proceeding). See Riko Enter., Inc. v.
Seattle Supersonics Corp. 357 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding arbitrator
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The dilemma created by contractually expanding the scope of judicial
review of an arbitration award beyond these four statutory grounds is readily
apparent. These four grounds are very narrow, and solely focused on the
arbitrator's behavior, and it would appear that Congress intended it to be that
way. 25 At the same time, though, if the FAA was intended to encourage
parties to exercise their freedom to contract for arbitration rather than
litigation, those same contractually liberated parties should be free to agree
on everything affecting their arbitration, including a standard of judicial
review that makes them comfortable and keeps them out of litigation.
Whether parties can contractually demand that a federal district court
review the arbitration award for grounds not mentioned in the FAA has split
the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. Some circuits, such as the Fourth,
Fifth and, until very recently, the Ninth allow such a demand.26 Others, such
as the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and the recently converted Ninth do not allow
such a supplementation of the FAA.27

misconduct or misbehavior, and thus vacating an award, was appropriate where National
Basketball Association Commissioner, acting as an arbitrator, failed to conduct a hearing
and refused to allow the party charged with misconduct to rebut charges with evidence).
24. See, e.g., Neary v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 63 F. Supp. 2d 208, 210-11 (D.
Conn. 1999) (finding that a terminated employee is entitled to vacation of the arbitration
award denying his claim pursuant to the manifest disregard of the law standard where the
arbitration panel seemed to have ignored his substantial evidence of bad motive, ignored
the summary judgment standard, and focused solely on the employer's justification for
termination. See Employers Ins. Co. v. Jeffries & Co., 958 F.2d 258, 261-62 (9th Cir.
1992) (explaining that a party cannot be forced into arbitration according to terms for
which it did not bargain, and for the arbitrator to attempt to force this is a misuse of
power); Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that
manifest disregard of the law can be a misuse of arbitrator power and may provide a basis
for vacating an arbitration award where it is shown that the arbitrator knew the law, the
law was clearly defined, and the arbitrator decided to ignore the law).
25. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000) (codifying a law that expressly limits judicial review
of arbitration awards to the four avenues for vacatur listed in the statute). See contra,
Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration With A ContractModel ofArbitration, 74
TUL. L. REv. 39, 79-80 (1999) (arguing that the legislative history behind the FAA
indicates that this law was promulgated in order to maximize party intent).
26. Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that parties to pre-dispute arbitration clauses may contractually expand the scope
of judicial review beyond the limited grounds set forth in the FAA). Syncor Int'l. Corp. v.
McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *16 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997)
(per curium) (holding parties to pre-dispute arbitration clauses may contractually expand
the scope of judicial review beyond the limited grounds set forth in the FAA). LaPine
Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1997) (hereinafter "LaPine I")
(holding parties to pre-dispute arbitration clauses may contractually expand the scope of
judicial review beyond the limited grounds set forth in the FAA).
27. See Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1505 (commenting, in dicta, that parties
to pre-dispute arbitration contracts may not expand the scope of judicial review beyond the
FAA, as this would be creating federal jurisdiction by contract). See also UHC Mgmt.
Co., Inc. v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998) (following Judge
Posner's dicta and forbidding the parties to contractually expand the scope of judicial
review beyond the FAA); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding that parties may not expand the scope of judicial review beyond the FAA);
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Corp., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (hereinafter
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C. A Brief Glimpse at This Article's Proposal
The Supreme Court of the United States should adopt an alternative
solution to resolve the circuit split. Instead of one hard rule, either
permitting the expansion of judicial review in all cases or denying it in all
cases, the Court should avoid the potentially disastrous consequences of such
a hard-line position. It should establish a presumption in favor of freedom to
contract for expanded review, placing a burden on the opponent to
demonstrate why the contractually expanded review would offend state
contract law or policy.
D. Roadmap
Part II of this Comment will acquaint the reader with federal Circuit
Court of Appeals' holdings allowing parties to contractually expand the
scope of judicial review beyond that which the FAA allows. Part II will also
include a look at how the Supreme Court has previously dealt with issues
arising under the FAA, forecasting why a presumption in favor of freedom to
contract would be readily acceptable to the Court. Part III will analyze the
federal Circuit Courts of Appeals cases that have invalidated parties'
attempts to contractually expand judicial review. Finally, Part IV will
provide a detailed roadmap for the Court to use as its tool for resolving the
circuit split by avoiding the potentially disastrous consequences of merely
adopting aperse stance on the issue, as some Circuits have done.

II. THE FREEDOM TO CONTRACT FOR EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Fils: A Case of Firstand Lasting Impression
The first federal case to evaluate whether parties to pre-dispute
arbitration contracts may contractually expand the scope of judicial review
beyond the limited grounds set forth by the FAA was Fils et Cables d'Acier
de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.28 Judge Conner, writing for the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,29held that parties
may indeed expand the scope of judicial review by contract.
In Fils, the parties had entered into two contracts for the purchase and
sale of galvanized wire. 30 The contracts contained pre-dispute arbitration
clauses binding them to commercial arbitration for dispute resolution, should
a disagreement surface. 31 Included in the contract was a clause that
expanded the scope of judicial review to include review for errors in
weighing evidence and application of law.32 This heightened standard is

"LaPine I1") (reversing its stance from LaPine I and holding that parties may not expand
the scope of judicial review beyond the FAA).
28. See Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 240.
29. Id. at 244.
30. Id.at 242.
31. Id.

32. Id.
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beyond the four narrow grounds listed in the FAA.33 At arbitration, the
arbitrator awarded damages to Fils et Cables, 34 while simultaneously
ordering Fils et Cables to pay Midland for settlement and related expenses.35
Fils et Cables sought the help of Judge Conner and the District Court to
confirm the award in all respects, while Midland attempted to have the award
vacated in part.
The court began its analysis by noting that arbitration is a "creature of
contract,.., favored by Congress and the courts as an alternative to the
complications" and price of traditional litigation. 37 The court explained that
arbitration is wholly dependent upon the agreement of the parties; therefore,
the resolution of this issue should find its answer directly in the terms of the
contract.38 The court was confident that this dispute should be resolved in
one of two ways. 39 The arbitration contract should either be enforced with
the expanded scope of judicial review, or the entire arbitration agreement
should be voided.n In Judge Conner's words, "a party cannot be compelled
to submit his dispute to arbitration under rules to which he has not
assented. '
Therefore, the court could not simply draw a line through
paragraph thirteen of the arbitration contract calling for an expanded scope
of judicial review as if this clause was separable from the arbitration contract
itself.4 2 The expansion provision in question was a material part of the
arbitration contract and had to either be enforced or the entire arbitration
contract voided, forcing the parties to pursue traditional litigation.4 3 The
court chose to enforce the arbitration contract with the expansion clause in
the name of freedom of contract principles. 4 This recognition of party
autonomy was not, however, without express restrictions.45
The court allowed the contractual expansion of judicial review because

33. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
34. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 243. Midland was directed to pay: "(a) $266,217.30 for
merchandise made in Taiwan; (b) $4,788.97 for merchandise in the hands of customers;
(c) 1,004,503 French francs for inventory; and (d) interest of $25,000 plus 135,000 francs
plus another 11 percent." Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.

37. Id.
nevertheless remains that arbitration is
38. Id.at 244 (reminding the parties that "[I]t
wholly dependent upon agreement").

39. Id.
40. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 243. If paragraph thirteen should not be enforced, "then the
entire arbitration provision of these contracts could not be enforced. The parties did not
agree to arbitrate their disputes in the customary sense; rather they agreed to a process by
which a nonjudicial body would make a determination, which would then be subject to
substantial judicial review." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id
45. Id.Freedom of contract ruled the day in the instant case because the facts were
absent a "jurisdictional or public policy barrier" to the parties' agreement to "alter the
standard roles" of an Article III Court. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 243.
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there were no apparent jurisdictional or public policy impediments. a6
Jurisdiction was based upon diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.4' The
court was unable to discover public policy impediments.4 8 The court also
reasoned that although contractually expanding the scope of judicial review
could take away some of the efficiency and finality of the arbitration process,
a district court hearing an appeal pursuant to an expansion clause would be
less burdened than it would be with a complete trial.49
B. A Court ofAppeals Weighs In
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit became the first of the federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals to decide the issue of contractual expansion of judicial review
beyond the FAA. 50
In Gateway Technologies, Inc., v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.,5' the Virginia Department of Corrections hired
MCI 52 to devise and operate a telephone system that would allow prisoners
to make collect calls to approved individuals without operator assistance. 3
MCI subcontracted Gateway to furnish, install, and maintain all the
necessary technology for the system.5 4 The parties' subcontract provided for
binding arbitration, "except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal. 55
A dispute between the parties ensued,56 good faith negotiations proved
fruitless and the arbitration57award in favor of Gateway was eventually
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
As a threshold issue,5 9 the Fifth Circuit held that parties may
46. Id

47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
48. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 244.
49. Id.Judge Conner's opinion explained why there existed no public policy grounds
in that case to trump the freedom of parties to contract for the judicial review they desired.
Id. Judge Conner admitted that the efficiency incentive of arbitration was injured by
paragraph thirteen's lengthening the duration of the dispute, but that did not provide
enough of a public policy reason sufficient to overcome freedom of contract in that case.
Id.He emphasized that arbitration did limit the burden on the court system, whereas a
full-blown trial did no such thing. Id.
50. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 993.
51. Id.
52. Id.at 995. MCI is a telephone service carrier, whose job it was to secure the local
lines over which the inmates would place the collect calls. Id.
53. Id.MCI was the successful bidder for the project. Id.
54. Id.
55. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 993. This short, succinct contractual expansion of the scope
of judicial review proved just as legally sufficient to provide for the expanded review as
the longer one in Fils. Fils, 584 F. Supp at 242.
56. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995-96. After installation, MCI complained to Gateway that
inmates were succeeding in placing many unauthorized collect calls. Id.at 995. MCI
decided to input its own system to bypass Gateway's allegedly faulty one. Id. MCI
thereby increased its profits an additional $84,000 each month. Id. at 996. In response,
Gateway offered to fix the faults in the system, but MCI refused to sign a confidentiality
agreement for the new Gateway software. Id.
57. Id. There was a contractual duty to negotiate in good faith in the event of a
contract dispute. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995. The arbitrator found that MCI had breached
this provision. Id.
58. Id.at 996. The court was forced to determine first whether the arbitration award
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contractually expand the scope of judicial review under the FAA because,
"arbitration is a creature of contract and the FAA's pro-arbitration policy
does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties." 59
60
The court thought it foolish to "frustrate the mutual intent of the parties."
However, the opinion failed to establish any qualifications upon this freedom
of contract principle as the Fils court had done eleven years earlier in New
York. 6'
C. UnpublishedSupportFrom the Fourth Circuit
In Syncor InternationalCorp. v. McLeland,62 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, adopted the holding and reasoning of
Gateway.63 Noting that while ordinarily a federal district court's review of
an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow pursuant to the FAA, such
review will be expanded because the parties agreed that "the arbitration
decision shall be final and binding on both parties, except that errors of law
shall be subject to appeal." 64 Relying on Gateway, the court was satisfied
that this contractual
expansion of judicial review under the FAA was
65
permissible.
D. The Ninth Circuit: LaPine Iand Supplementation of the FAA
Before its recent about-face on the issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals had authored the most articulate opinion allowing parties to
contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond the four narrow

could be lawfully vacated under the FAA. Id.
59. Id. The Court also initially considered the standard of review to be de novo,
reversing the district court's specially crafted "harmless error standard." Id.
60. Id. at 997.
61. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 244. The Gateway Court failed to qualify its strong holding
to freedom of contract principles as the primary justification for allowing parties to
contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond the FAA. Gateway, 64 F.3d at
997. There was no mention of public policy or jurisdictional qualifiers. Id. Whether the
Gateway Court thought these qualifiers unimportant, or merely sidestepped discussion of
them because they were not present, is an open question.
62. Syncor Int'l. Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at
*16 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
63. Id.The Syncor Court explained its reasoning as follows:
In this case, however, the parties contractually agreed to permit expanded review of
the arbitration award by the federal courts. Specifically, their contract details that
'the arbitration decision shall be final and binding on both parties, except that errors
of law shall be subject to appeal ....Such a contractual modification is acceptable

because, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of
contract ....Because these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review,

their contractual provision supplements the FAA's default standard of review and
allows for de novo review of issues of law embodied in the arbitration award.
Id.

64. Id. This contractual expansion of the scope of judicial review, though worded
differently, provided the same legal effect as the two other cases surveyed thus far. See
Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 242; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995.
65. Syncor, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *16.
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standards listed in the FAA.66 In LaPine Technology v. Kyocera,67
68
(hereinafter "LaPine I") both corporations were partners in a three-party
6
9
venture to manufacture and market computer disk drives. An unfortunate
fiscal downturn for LaPine resulted in a restructuring of the partnership.7 °
The third partner was eliminated pursuant to a new agreement, requiring
Kyocera to take on added responsibility. 7 ' Kyocera objected to this revision
and later refused to comply with the new contract; LaPine then sued for
breach.72
The revised agreement contained a binding pre-dispute arbitration
clause.73 Additionally, the parties had agreed on an expanded scope of
judicial review beyond the FAA.74 At arbitration, an award was entered in
favor of LaPine, causing Kyocera to petition the federal district court for
vacatur of the award, while LaPine moved for confirmation. 75 The district
court had decided to review the arbitration award on only the limited FAA
grounds for vacatur and, not surprisingly, found no reason to vacate the
award.76 Kyocera then appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing error on behalf
of the district court for failure to review the case on the contractually
expanded review standard.77
The Ninth Circuit reversed the federal district court and decided to
honor the contract to expand judicial review, aligning itself with Fils,
Syncor, and Gateway.78 The circuit court began its analysis by noting that
66. LaPinel, 130 F.3d at 884.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 886. The third party was Prudential-Bache, who provided financing for this
venture as a middleman. Id. Prudential-Bache "would purchase Kyocera's entire output
of drives and sell those drives to LaPine," who was responsible for the marketing of the

drives. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. LaPine 1, 130 F.3d at 886.
73. Id. at 886-87. The arbitration clause set forth the following procedures and rules:
A party desiring to submit a matter to arbitration shall give written notice to the
other parties hereto .... The arbitrators shall decide the matters submitted based
upon the evidence presented, the terms of this Agreement, the Agreement in

Principle and the laws of the State of California. The arbitrators shall issue a
written award which shall state the basis of the award and include detailed findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
Id.
74. Id. at 887. This clause prescribes that:
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California may enter
judgment upon any award either by confirming the award, or by vacating,

modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any
award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act,
(ii) where the arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence,

or (iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous.
Id
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. LaPine 1, 130 F.3d at 887.

78. Id. at 888.
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there were other judge-made grounds for vacatur beyond the FAA, such as
the "completely irrational" test and the "manifest disregard of law"
standard,79 implying that courts should not deny arbitrating parties expanded
review on the narrow interpretation that the four grounds listed in the FAA
were the only gateway to such review. The Ninth Circuit stated that [the]
"FAA is not an apotropaion[ 8 ] designed to avert overburdened court
dockets; it is designed to avert interference with the contractual rights of
parties. 's
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit later reversed itself and
thus abandoned the above reasoning. The reversal will be discussed later.
E. The ContractuallyExpansionist Courts: A Summary
Freedom of contract has powerful justification for allowing a
contractually expanded scope of judicial review. 82 There are, however,
subtle differences among these circuits. Fils offered a qualified principle of
freedom of contract.8 3 Gateway and Syncor were, for the most part, devoid
of limits on party autonomy. 4 The LaPine I court pointed to the established
ability of the federal district courts to supplement the FAA when needed.85
LaPine I was also quick to caution its critics that the FAA is not a magic
wand for judges to wave and thus alleviate their dockets by refusing to hear
petitions for vacatur beyond the four grounds listed in the FAA.86
III.

JUDICIAL REFUSAL TO ALLOW CONTRACTUAL EXPANSION

Four federal circuits have, conversely, rejected arbitrating parties'
efforts to contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond the
FAA. 7 Although contractual expansion is the better approach 8 and is

79. Id.See also Marcus Mungioli, The Manifest DisregardOf The Law Standard: A
Vehicle For Modernization Of The Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1079,
1080-1122 (2000) (reviewing various appellate circuit courts that have adopted the
manifest disregard of the law standard).
80. WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 99 (25th ed. 1990). Apotropaic is defined as "able or
believed to be able to ward off evil." Id.
81. LaPine 1, 130 F.3d at 891.
82. In addition to the above cases that discuss contractual expansion, see Roadway
Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (illustrating the Third

Circuit's position: parties may opt out of the FAA's limited grounds for vacatur and
fashion their own more restrictive grounds for review). The Third Circuit examined the
issue only briefly, footnoted the "great weight of authority," and reasoned "parties may
opt-out of the FAA's off-the-rack vacatur standards and fashion their own." Kayser, 257
F.3d at 293.
83. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 240.
84. Syncor, U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 at *16; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 993.
85. LaPinel, 130 F.3d at 888-89.
86. Id.
at 891.
87. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (rejecting, sometimes in dicta, the notion
that parties may contractually expand the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards).
88. See Cullinan,supra note 13, at 428 (explaining that allowing contractual expansion

is sound policy because the primary goal of the FAA is "to enforce the parties' agreements
to the letter, lending confidence" to arbitration as a viable alternative dispute resolution
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supported by previous Supreme Court holdings, 89 circuits prohibiting
contractual expansion when federal policy favors expansion should not be
entirely disregarded. 90 The following cases should be respected as a firm
warning of the possible havoc that might be wrought if the Supreme Court
allows unqualified contractual expansion of the scope of judicial review
beyond the FAA. 9' Because of this possible havoc, the Supreme Court
should recognize possible policy and contract defenses that could rebut the
presumption of freedom to contract.
A.

The Seventh Circuit Genesis
In 1991, Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, rejected the idea that parties to a pre-dispute arbitration clause
could contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond the FAA.92
In Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,93 the union
brought a grievance complaining that the Sun-Times had made changes to
some of the conditions and terms of employment; these changes were alleged
to be in violation of a contract called the "Supplemental Agreement". 94 At
arbitration, the Sun-Times prevailed. 95 The union subsequently brought an
unsuccessful petition to vacate the arbitration award in federal district court,
while the Sun-Times won confirmation of the award.96
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the arbitrator's award,
explaining that its ability to reverse the decision was severely constrained.97
Though contractual expansion of the scope of judicial review was not a
direct issue in the case, Judge Posner offered his thoughts on the topic as
dicta. 98 "If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration
option).
89. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)
(reasoning that courts should interpret contracts in such a way that respects "the expressed

intentions of the parties"); Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989) (commenting that since parties can specify the issues to be arbitrated in the
contract, they can also name the rules to govern the arbitration); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) (observing that the FAA's legislative history

was unambiguous in its belief that arbitration contracts should be enforced exactly the
same as any other type of contract so as to correct the historic judicial hesitance to enforce
such arbitration contracts).
90. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 511 (warning the judiciary against the problems that
come with allowing contractual expansion of judicial review under the FAA).

91. Id.
92. Chicago Typographical,935 F.2d at 1505.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1501.
1503.
1503-04.
1504-05. Posner remarked:

The appeal from the decision upholding the arbitration award is the easier, so let us

take it first. Federal courts do not review the soundness of arbitration awards. An
agreement to submit a dispute over the interpretation of a labor or other contract to

arbitration is a contractual commitment to abide by the arbitrator's interpretation.
Id.
98. LaPine 1, 130 F.3d at 890. "Thus, it seems that [Posner's] cryptic assertion about
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panel to review the arbitrator's award. But they cannot contract for judicial
review of that award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract." 99
1.

An Observation

Judge Posner's suggestion that parties should consider contracting for
an appellate arbitration panel is a temporary solution, and may be a delicious
alternative for many potential parties who would like to reserve a second bite
at the apple.' 00 Regardless, Judge Posner's rejection of parties' ability to
contract for expanded judicial review of an arbitration award is tenuous.' 0'
Binding arbitration under the FAA cannot exist without parties
contracting for resolution of their dispute outside of the courtroom in front of
an arbitrator.' 0 2 By insisting that parties can never create federal appellate
jurisdiction by contract, Judge Posner was most likely endeavoring to protect
the federal docket from the voluminous appeals that would result from
district court reviews. 103 It is at least safe to assume this was the case since
he failed to cite any authority for the above dicta.10 4 However, it appears that
the Seventh Circuit did not consider that by making such a hardline rule,
parties might be scared away from arbitration altogether, choosing litigation
instead. 105

jurisdiction is dicta." Id. See also Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of Arbitration,
31 CAP. U.L. REV. 383, 405 (2003) (suggesting that Congress, not the courts, settle this
dispute; Wood is currently a Seventh Circuit Justice).
99. Chicago Typographical,935 F.2d at 1505.
100. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 549 (stating that the main advantage of arbitration is
that it allows parties to avoid the court system, and this advantage will be lost if parties are
allowed back into the court system for a second bite at the apple).
101. See Brunet, supra note 25, at 69-71 (explaining that Judge Posner's dicta is
especially cryptic and somewhat surprising, as it may be against market based economic
considerations). See also Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126
F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (pleading with sister courts to "shake off the old judicial
hostility to arbitration"); Carrington, supra note 17, at 339 (reminding the reader that one
has to go back as far as the 19th Century to see American courts guard their jurisdiction
from contractual arbitration).
102. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). This section reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
Id.
103. See Carrington, supra note 17, at 332 (explaining that the judicial trend when
viewing commercial arbitration is one of conserving judicial resources by encouraging
arbitration in lieu of litigation).
104. See LaPine 1, 130 F.3d at 890 (commenting that Judge Posner's dicta concerning
parties' inability to create federal jurisdiction by contract under the FAA was never
reasoned or explained).
105. Recent Case: Arbitration - Standardof Review - Tenth CircuitRejects Contractual
Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1272
(2002). "Many parties, as evidenced by Bowen and cases arising in similar contexts,
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The Seventh Circuit will thus be faced with the same large number 1of6
appeals, only now the appeals will contain lengthy trial records to review 0
instead of their streamlined arbitration counterparts. 0 7 Although Judge
Posner suggested that contracting for an appellate arbitration panel to review
the arbitration award for errors of law might solve this dilemma and satisfy
the parties, it is difficult to believe that parties to arbitration, who desire the
proper legal
outcome, will place the legal error review in the hands of non08
judges.'
2.

Judge Posner'sDicta: A Useful Warning

Nonetheless, Judge Posner's hesitance concerning jurisdiction is a
reality check to those who espouse unlimited freedom of contract. °9 After
all, the FAA does not confer jurisdiction independently."10 It would be a
dangerous precedent to allow arbitration parties into federal court through
the backdoor of contractual expansion of judicial review, when neither
federal question nor diversity jurisdiction is satisfied."' This concern is not
new, as Judge Connor expressed jurisdictional
hesitance to expand the scope
2
Fils."1
in
arbitration
of
review
judicial
of
B.

The Eighth Circuit ContributesIts Own Dicta, But With Passivity

The case of UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp. was

appear to tie their commitments to arbitration to the availability of contractually modified
standards ofjudicial review." Id.
106. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that the phrase, "judicial review of arbitration awards" is a non-sequitur and
should not be called "review," since this circuit is not dedicated to allowing disappointed
parties back into litigation through the backdoor of appellate review). Id.
107. See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 (admitting that even the Tenth Circuit realizes
appellate review of an arbitration award is certainly less arduous than hearing a diversity
or federal question case).
108. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law

Through Arbitration,83 MtNN. L. REV. 703, 753 (1999) (pointing out that creating law is
difficult, "requiring education in the law and sensitivity to the interests of various groups
in society," and that judges are better suited than private parties to make law).
109. See Di Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?,4 HARV.

NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 237-39 (1999) (reminding the reader that concern over jurisdiction is
vital to any expanded judicial review analysis). See also Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods,
Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 772, 776 (N.D. I11.
2002) (holding parties may not contractually
expand the scope of judicial review beyond the FAA, as Judge Posner has already settled
this issue).
110. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 109, at 237.
111. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,26 (1983)
(commenting that the FAA is quite the anomaly in the realm of federal jurisdiction
because when an arbitrating party enlists the help of a federal court, an independent
jurisdictional basis is required). See also Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 359
(7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the FAA may not be a source of jurisdiction, but rather, an
offer of procedures for a "class of cases otherwise within federal jurisdiction").
112. See Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 244 (noting that jurisdictional or public policy issues
might preclude such expansion ofjudicial review).

2003]

Agreeing to Disagree

brought to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1998.113 The case involved
UHC, a fund contractor, and Computer Sciences Corporation, a claim
processing company.' 4 The parties entered into a contract in which
Computer Sciences agreed to process claims from the beneficiaries of an
employee medical care fund.11 5 A dispute arose; both parties, after a fruitless
attempt to negotiate in good faith, demanded arbitration pursuant to the

contract." 16

so

At arbitration, a panel found a mutual breach of contract,"1 but8
damages were solely proven by UHC in the amount of 1.3 million dollars."1
UHC successfully moved the district court for confirmation of the award
while Computer Sciences unsuccessfully sought vacature of the award. 1 9
Because the contract included a clause that the arbitration be "bound by
controlling law," Computer Sciences appealed on the basis0 that there was
contractual expansion of judicial review agreed to by UHC.12
Though the court did explicitly reserve the question of expansion of
judicial review for another time, 12 1 the court, in dicta, did not allow the
argument for contractual expansion to get very far. 22 Citing a previous
113. UHC, 148 F.3d at 992.
114. Id. at 994.

115. Id.
116. Id. The agreement to arbitrate was set forth as follows:
Disputes - In the event a dispute between United and Contractor arises out of or is
related to this Agreement, the parties shall meet and negotiate in good faith to
attempt to resolve the dispute. In the event the dispute is not resolved within 30
days of the date one party sent written notice of the dispute to the other party, and if
either party wishes to pursue the dispute, either party may submit it to binding
arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. In
no event may arbitration be initiated more than one year following the sending of
written notice of the dispute. Any arbitration proceeding under this Agreement
shall be conducted in Hennepin County, Minnesota, U.S.A., or in a mutually
agreeable location. The arbitrators shall have no authority to award any punitive or
exemplary damages, or to vary or ignore the terms of this Agreement, and shall be
bound by controlling law.
Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. UHC, 148 F.3d at 994-95.
120. Id. at 996-97.
121. Id. at 998. The UHC Court decided that the resolution of this issue regarding
whether parties may contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond the FAA
was better left to another case that was more on point: "Although Computer Sciences's
argument raises an interesting question, we are content to reserve its resolution for a time
when circumstances require it." Id.
122. Id. The court thought that the parties had not expressed clear intent that their
arbitration be subject to expanded judicial review. Id. See also, Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc.,
341 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2003) (reaffirming the Eighth Circuit emphasis on unambiguous
clarity of intent as a prerequisite to expanding the scope of judicial review). Although the
Schoch court remained academically skeptical of contractual expansion of judicial review,
a definitive stance on the issue was once again delayed until the circumstances require it.
Id. at 794. By insisting on clarity of intent, it would appear that the Eighth Circuit may be
sympathetic to parties that rely on an unambiguous expansion of judicial review as a
material part of their contract to arbitrate. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[36:1005

Eighth Circuit case, the court reasoned, "that where arbitration is
contemplated the courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial review
given to structured judgments defined by procedural rules and legal
principles."' 2 3 The court also stated, "Parties should be aware that they get
for and that arbitration is far different from
what they bargain
124
adjudication."'
The Eighth Circuit also cited the dissenting opinion of the Ninth Circuit
in LaPine I, where Judge Mayer explained that contracts to expand the scope
of judicial review are not an element of procedure that arbitrating parties
customarily alter pursuant to contract; such expansion is instead an attempt
to compel a federal court to do as the parties please. 125 The UHC court did,
however, leave the door open to possible future contractual expansion of the
scope of judicial review as long as the parties' intent is unambiguous. 126 The
clause in the case at bar lacked this clarity of intent; the court was therefore
content to end the analysis of the issue with a denial of expansion. 27 A fair
to allow
reading of this case indicates that the Eighth Circuit may be willing
128
contractual expansion when the parties' intent to do so is clear.
C. The Tenth CircuitAnomaly:
A Questionable, But Nonetheless Distinguishable,Precedent
In 2001, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bowen v. Amoco
Petroleum, rejected contractual expansion of the scope of judicial review
beyond the FAA, and became the first Circuit to come out from behind the
warm blanket of dicta to do so.129 When an Amoco pipeline polluted a
creek, property owner Ernesto Bowen sought damages in an Oklahoma
federal district court.' 30 Amoco did not respond to the complaint, but
successfully moved for a stay of the proceedings while asking for an order
123. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 (8th Cir. 1986).
124. Id.
125. UHC, 148 F.3d at 997-998 (quoting LaPinel, 130 F.3d at 884)
Whether to arbitrate, what to arbitrate, how to arbitrate, and when to arbitrate are
matters that parties may specify contractually... However, Kyocera cites no
court must
authority explicitly empowering litigants to dictate how an Article IlI

review an arbitration decision. Absent this, they may not. Should parties desire
more scrutiny than the [FAA] authorizes courts to apply, "they can contract for an
appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award[;] they cannot contract

for judicial review of that award.
Id.
126. Id. at 998. "Assuming that it is possible to contract for expanded judicial review of
an arbitration award, the parties' intent to do so must be clearly and unmistakably
expressed." Id.

127. Id.
128. Id. The court would not, it seems, have assumed it was "possible to contract for
expanded judicial review of an arbitration award" if the court thought it was impossible.
Id.
129. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936. "Although we are the first circuit to hold that parties may

not contract for an expanded standard of review, two circuits have indicated they too
would reject contractually expanded standards. In dicta, both the Seventh and the Eighth

Circuits have expressed disapproval of contractually expanded standards of review." Id.
130. Id. at 928.
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compelling arbitration pursuant to a provision in a 1918 right-of-way
contract. 13 ' Prior to arbitration, the parties also agreed that their arbitration
would include the right to appeal any arbitration award to the district court
within thirty32 days "on the grounds that the award is not supported by the
1
evidence."'

Following an arbitration panel's consideration of the case, an award
was issued in favor of the Bowens in excess of five million dollars for
compensatory and punitive damages.' 3 3 The Bowens then successfully
moved the Oklahoma federal district court for 34confirmation of the award,
while Amoco filed its doomed notice of appeal.
The federal district court confirmed the arbitration award 3 5 and the
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 136
The Tenth Circuit's analysis began by
acknowledging that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have allowed such
contractual expansion by following the reasoning in the United States
Supreme Court case of Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees.137 In
Volt, the Court held that the FAA's purpose is that of "ensuring that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms."'
Other
Supreme Court cases have held steadfastly to the notion that a contract to
arbitrate should be enforced rigorously. 139After paying homage to the litany
of decisions where the Court emphasized the contractual nature of
arbitration, 140 the Tenth Circuit proceeded to justify its anomalous holding.
1.

The Tenth Circuit Used a Sleight-of-Word Tactic to Justify its Holding

According to the Tenth Circuit, the expanded judicial review clause
was an attempt to "interfere with the judicial process."' 14 1 The Court astutely
pointed to the Volt opinion as rather supportive of its view, and not
supportive of the contractual expansionists.1 42 The Supreme Court in Volt

131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.at 930.
Id.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
Id.
Id.at 941.

137. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court stated that contracts for arbitration are
to be enforced according to their terms without qualification. Id.

138. Id.
139. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57 (stating that in interpreting arbitration contracts,
the courts should defer to the intentions of the parties). See also Allied-Bruce Terminix v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (pointing out that the purpose of the FAA was to
encourage courts to enforce arbitration agreements); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (noting that the FAA mandates the enforcement of these private
agreements); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood, 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (stating that the FAA
was intended to make arbitration agreements "as enforceable as other contracts").
140. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933-34.
141. Id. at 934. "We disagree, however, with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' conclusion
that the Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the FAA's primary purpose compels
enforcement of contractual modifications of judicial review ... [Volt] never said parties
are free to interfere with the judicial process." Id.
142. Id.
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noted that enforcing the parties' contract in that case "[gave] effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to
the policies behind ...the FAA.' 43 Following this quote in the Volt
holding, the Tenth Circuit creatively reframed the issue as whether the
proposed contractual expansion "conflicts with federal policies furthered by
the FAA.'1 4 The court thereby converted the more demanding "doing
violence" standard required by the Volt Supreme Court into the easier
"conflicts" standard. 145 It is this sleight-of-word that enabled the Tenth
46
Circuit to make a persuasive case against freedom to contract principles.1
2.

Reliance On Arbitrationas Cheaper and Quicker: Misplaced?

The Bowen court explained the conflicts it found apparent in the
proposed contractual expansion of judicial review. 47 First, it noted that
expanded judicial review conflicts with the legislative intent to only allow
limited vacatur grounds, thus ensuring "judicial respect for the arbitration
149
process,"' 148 and to preserve "the independence of the arbitration process."'
Secondly, the court found a conflict between expanded review and the
Supreme Court's established view, found in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., that "by agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades
the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the
150
simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration.""
However, this position seems a relic given the expansion in complexity
143. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. (emphasis added).
144. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935. (emphasis added).

The Tenth Circuit narrowed the

ultimate question to "whether the alternate rule conflicts with federal policies furthered by
the FAA." Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.

148. Id. The Tenth Circuit discussed its view that the FAA intended to provide a
narrow scope of review of these agreements:
Unlike the contract clause at issue in Volt, the contract clause in this case threatens
to undermine the policies behind the FAA. We would reach an illogical result if we
concluded that the FAA's policy of ensuring judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements is well served by allowing for expansive judicial review after the matter
is arbitrated. The FAA's limited review ensures judicial respect for the arbitration
process and prevents courts from enforcing parties' agreements to arbitrate only to
refuse to respect the results of the arbitration. These limited standards manifest a
legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring arbitration by preserving the
independence of the arbitration process.

Id
149. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
150. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). In
Mitsubishi, the plaintiff car manufacturer had signed a pre-dispute arbitration clause with

defendant car dealership sending all disputes to arbitration under the FAA. Id.at 617. The
trial court held that the defendant's antitrust claims were appropriate for arbitration. Id. at
620-21. The reviewing court reversed this order. Id. at 623. The Supreme Court then
reversed the reviewing court. Id.at 640. The Supreme Court held that the antitrust claim
did not invalidate the arbitration agreement. Id.at 628-29. The Court emphasized the
strong presumption in favor of arbitration agreements in international commerce. Id.
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and volume of arbitration over the years.' 51 There is a need for empirical
research into whether commercial arbitration is really simpler, more
informal, or more expeditious than commercial litigation before the Supreme
Court is persuaded to affirm the Tenth Circuit's holding on these unexplored
foundations. 152 To affirm the Tenth Circuit would be to arrest the freedom of
contract in the name of Mitsubishi's dubious foundations.' 53 Such
blanket
54
confirmation should not be endorsed by a court of final review.1
3. The Hidden Secret Behind the Tenth Circuit'sHolding: The Separate
Agreement to ContractuallyExpandJudicialReview
It is important to understand that the clause attempting to contractually
expand the scope of judicial review in Bowen was not part of the original
1918 agreement for arbitration, as was the case in all the holdings examined
previously. 55 The Bowen contractual expansion of judicial review was a
separate, post-dispute, post-1918 addition.' 56
Therefore, unlike the
contractual expansionist cases reviewed above, the Bowen parties did not
rely on the expansion of judicial review as a material part of their arbitration
contract. 157 They, instead, agreed to it later, some years after the agreement
to arbitrate. Bowen can therefore be limited to its peculiar facts.
Such a separate contract to expand judicial review, not relied upon by
the parties when they initially decided to arbitrate, could fairly be
characterized as an abuse of the federal judiciary, or what Judge Posner calls
an attempt to create federal jurisdiction by contract.' 58 A rule preventing this
kind of contract would be a good idea. Bowen's precedential weight should
be limited to that rule, however. It would be completely ignorant of basic
151. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 348 (1995)

(commenting that "increasing numbers of more complex commercial disputes ... are
being routinely submitted to arbitration" under the FAA).
152. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,
432 (1988) (lamenting the lack of empirical research on commercial arbitration). But see
Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As) summed "Consent" of Commercial Binding
Arbitration Contracts:An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional
Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 643-46 (2003) (discussing a recent survey of

transactional lawyers regarding their expectations of and attitudes about commercial
binding arbitration).
153. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
154. Contra Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31. If, however, modem federal binding arbitration is
really not so simple, informal, and expeditious when compared to modem litigation, it

would be a grave mistake to deprive parties the freedom to contract for expanded judicial
review relying on such a fiction. If through empirical research or otherwise, the Supreme
Court realizes that its Mitsubishi quote is unfounded, it would be incumbent upon them to
welcome parties into an appellate review of their arbitration awards because arbitration is
forever debunked as a meaningful alternative to litigation. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
"[Arbitration] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Id.
155. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Chicago Typographical,935 F.2d at 1505.
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contract law principles for any court to per se void a dickered expansion
clause, relied upon in an initial contract to arbitrate, and still confirm the
arbitration award. 59 Because of its facts, Bowen did not go that far, nor
should subsequent courts read Bowen that broadly.

D. The Ninth CircuitRevisited. LaPine II and En Banc Reversal
After winding its way back up the appellate ladder, Lapine I, was
160
reconsidered en banc by the Ninth Circuit in LaPine 11 and reversed.
After seven pages of procedurally justifying its self-reversal, and likening
the Lapine II court set forth
itself to the Lawrence v. Texas Supreme 6Court,
1
its legal reasoning for changing its mind.'
LaPine H began by emphasizing, as did Bowen, that contracting to
expand judicial review may potentially make arbitration longer, costlier and
less private, thus removing the long-storied traditional benefits of the
arbitration process.' 62 Given this emphasis, the Ninth Circuit will no longer
allow parties to contractually expand the scope of judicial review. 63 The
problem with rejecting contractual expansion for fear of the aforementioned
is that the Court seems to forget that parties are completely free to contract
for "benefit-less" arbitration if they so choose. Therefore, such paternalism
stressing preservation of these traditional benefits for the parties is surely
appreciated, but is understandably unwelcome when parties contract to risk
some of those benefits in exchange for a legally sound outcome.
The Court then addressed a contractual issue that had not been
mentioned in the cases since the Fils court discussed it over a decade ago. 64
The issue was whether the judicial expansion clause could be severed from
the agreement to arbitrate.'
The Fils court had determined that they could
not simply remove this material part from the contract to arbitrate under the
law. 1 66 The LaPine 11 court came to the opposite conclusion, however, as a
recent California Supreme Court case held that judicial review expansion
clauses are illegal and thus severable under certain conditions. 67 LaPine H
clause and promptly severed it
thus announced the illegality of the expansion
68
from the underlying contract to arbitrate.'
E. The ContractuallyCautious Courts: A Summary
The courts that hold parties to pre-dispute arbitration contracts may not

159. See Fuller, supra note 6, at 810-12 (explaining that parties to contracts rely on the
"expectation that the promise [will] be fulfilled").
160. LaPine l, 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at 994-97.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 998.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1000-02.
Id.

166. Fils, 584 F. Supp at 243.
167. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 985-987 (Cal. 2003).
168. LaPine II, 341 F.3d at 1002.
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supplement the FAA by contractually expanding the scope of judicial review
do not emphasize the freedom to contract. 169 Instead, they uniformly find it
repugnant that parties could be allowed to reach beyond the FAA and agree
to federal appellate review of an arbitration award beyond what Congress
listed in that statute. 17 However, the contractual expansion of judicial
review has never been disallowed when it was relied upon as a material part
of an underlying pre-dispute arbitration contract, unless there was a state law
contractual defense thereto. If such a case presents itself, the pre-dispute
contractual expansion clause should carry a presumption of enforceability.
There is also a fear, in the contractually cautious circuits, that such
contractual expansion would turn arbitration into a step-ladder to appellate
litigation on the legal merits.' 71 The Supreme Court will thus be faced with
the quandary of how to best resolve this collision between its own
endorsement of freedom of contract principles and Congress's
intention to
72
allow only limited grounds for review of arbitration awards.'
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT

Whether arbitrating parties may contractually expand the scope of
judicial review beyond the FAA to include judicial review for errors of law
will continue to depend on which court the parties find themselves in until
the Supreme Court resolves this circuit split.

73

Rather than simply affirming

one of the two positions in this controversy, the Court should preserve
binding arbitration as a meaningful alternate method of dispute resolution by
appeasing those commercial parties who74 wish to utilize arbitration, but who
also demand a legally correct outcome.'
First, the Supreme Court must recognize that federal binding arbitration
is at a critical juncture and that American jurisprudence must be careful
when deciding an issue of this magnitude. 75 Second, the Court must

169. See Chicago Typographical,935 F.2d at 1505 (placing less emphasis on freedom
to contract as the Court, instead, commented that parties cannot create jurisdiction by
contract).
170. Id.
171. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 524 (commenting that "there must have been
Congressional intent [in the FAA] to not allow arbitrable matters back into court for a
review of the merits of an arbitration award").
172. See Ronald Greenberg, Uncertain Appeal: Both Opponents and Advocates of
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Decisions Invoke the Intent of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 25 Los ANGELES LAWYER 35, 38 (October 2002) (commenting that a
review of the relevant Federal Circuit Court of Appeals cases on this issue shows that the
contractually expansionist Circuits' "focus is upon the FAA's strong policy of enforcing
the right of the parties to define their agreements to arbitrate," while the contractually
cautious Circuits' "focus is upon the congressional intent of the FAA, which is to limit the
scope of appellate review").
173. See David Daar, Closing Argument: When Arbitration Loses its Appeal, 25 Los
ANGELES LAWYER 68, 68 (July/August 2002) (noting that parties can always contract for
appellate arbitration review, rather than judicial review).
174. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood, 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J. dissenting)
(noting that arbitrators may be "wholly unqualified to decide legal issues").
175. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 151, at 346 (stating that "[c]ommercial
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acknowledge that either strictly allowing or strictly denying arbitrating
parties the option to contract for expanded judicial review could be
disastrous as to whether parties view arbitration as a healthy option for
resolving disputes.' 76 Third, the Court should establish a presumption in
favor of the right to contract for expanded review, but still allow opponents
an avenue to overcome the presumption and have the expansion defeated if it
violates public policy or contract principles. 177
A.

The FirstStep: Understandingthat FederalBinding
Arbitrationis at a CriticalJuncture

For too long,178 American courts have ignored possible concerns for the
longevity of federal binding arbitration. 179 Recently, commentators have
180
noted that the future of commercial arbitration is by no means assured.
There are inherent characteristics of federal binding arbitration that put it at a
disadvantage with state and federal judiciaries as the preferred method of
dispute resolution.'81
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have ignored the faults of
arbitration for too long and are at least partly responsible' 82 for the almost

arbitration is at a critical juncture in its movement from the periphery of the civil justice
system to its center stage"). See also Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in
Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 105 (1997)

(commenting that the growing volume and variety of arbitration cases are evidence that
businesses are increasingly turning to binding arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism).
176. See infra notes 180-190 and accompanying text (explaining the potential negative
impact on the perception of arbitration as a healthy alternative dispute resolution option if
one extreme or another is adopted).
177. See supra Introduction (indicating that this Comment's proposal will provide such
a plan).
178. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 180 (N.Y. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting)
(writing, "this ...[case] should have been submitted to the arbitration of sportsmen").
179. See Soia Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-56
(1961) (noting that arbitration has been practiced in America for over two hundred years);
Hayford and Peeples, supra note 151, at 380 (stating that "[t]he preceding description of
contemporary commercial arbitration reveals several dimensions of the current process
that may limit its long-run viability as a widely-employed substitute for traditional
litigation"). See also Jean Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme
Court'sPreferencefor BindingArbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (predicting that in the

year 2010, teachers of civics will recall for their students that once upon a time, before the
dominance of arbitration, the United States Constitution guaranteed all persons a trial by
jury, due process of law, adequate notice, an unbiased judge, "the right to be represented
by counsel ... the right to present evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, and the right to some explanation of the judge's decision").
180. See Hayford and Peeples, supra note 151, at 380 (pointing out that whether
commercial arbitration will survive as a viable entity is an open question).
18 1.See id at 413 (warning that today there are numerous "substantial question[s] as to
whether the process of commercial arbitration will achieve the level of rigor and reliability
necessary to justify" the kind of strong historical deference given it by the federal courts).
182. See Levin, supra note 175, at 105-06 (commenting that the federal judiciary has
played a key role in furthering the growing role of commercial arbitration by enforcing
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obscene growth of this lucrative, 183 privatized industry. I1 4 Many scholars,
including a preeminent commentator in the field, Jean R. Sternlight, have
criticized the Supreme Court's almost blind preference for arbitration. 85 Not
only is the justice system becoming privatized, there is also no development
of the law.' 8 6 Even if an arbitrator writes an opinion, it cannot be cited for
any precedential value, thus partly debunking the myth that arbitration is
time saving and efficient.' 87 It would undoubtedly save time if arbitrator
cases could narrow or dispose of new disputes
opinions from previous
8
precedence.18
through
The Supreme Court must, therefore, use this opportunity to reassess its
jealous preference for arbitration and inject sound principles of law into
binding arbitration under the FAA, not only because parties are asking for it,
that parties continue to choose arbitration in
but also because it will ensure
89
1
litigation.
traditional
of
lieu
B.

The Second Step: Acknowledging the DangersInherent in
Choosing One Position and Wholly Excluding the Other

The policy and purpose behind Congressional enactment of the FAA in
1925 was to provide parties with an avenue to contract for arbitration that
would not only settle their dispute, but also an agreement that subsequent
pre-dispute arbitration clauses and "showing deference to the decisions of arbitrators").
See also Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272-73 (holding that contracts to arbitrate disputes
involving or affecting interstate commerce are enforceable).
183. See Brunet, supra note 25, at 52 (noting, "At present, arbitration services are
supplied in a very competitive market. Parties ... have a broad and diverse choice of
arbitrators. Rivalry is intense among individual arbitrators and firms who provide
arbitration services").
184. See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An

Economic Analysis, 8 S. CT. EcON. REV. 209, 243 (2000) (noting that one influential
argument against arbitration is that its privatized nature contributes to the "erosion of the
publicly accessible stock of common-law rules" and stunts the growth of new legal rules).
See also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984) (resisting
the trend towards private adjudicators).
185. See Sternlight, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the FAA as favoring arbitration over traditional litigation is
unconstitutional because it contradicts constitutional rights to a trial, a life tenured judge,
and due process).
186. Interview with Professor Celeste Hammond, Director of Real Estate Law, The
John Marshall Law School, in Chicago, 111.(June 13, 2002). See Carbonneau, supra note
17, at 224 (arguing that unlimited arbitrability privatizes an entire range of formerly public
juridical responsibilities).
187. Calvin William Sharpe, Integrity Review of Statutory Arbitration Awards, 54

HASTINGS L.J. 311, 354-58 (2003) (emphasizing the importance of an arbitrator's written
opinion to a subsequent judicial review).
188. Id.
189. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking The Supreme
Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 701 (1996) (asserting

that "[I]t is time for the Supreme Court to reassess its extreme preference for mandatory
binding arbitration"). See contra United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co. 222 F. 1006, 1010-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (expressing judicial hostility
towards arbitration).
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courts would respect and enforce.' 90 In light of this policy goal, it may seem
to many a forgone conclusion that the Court should allow parties to
contractually expand the scope of judicial review. Adopting this stance
wholesale, however, as the Fourth, Fifth, and formerly the Ninth Circuits
have done, may lead to the emasculation of binding arbitration as an
appetizing option for future parties.' 91
To allow unchecked contractual expansion of judicial review generates
a very real practical concern, namely the survival of binding arbitration as a
meaningful alternative method of dispute resolution. 92 Parties may decide
to opt for litigation in lieu of arbitration because extended judicial review
strips arbitration of its qualities of efficiency and affordability. 93 When
faced with choosing litigation or arbitration with the right of judicial appeal,
parties and their attorneys may abandon arbitration, as it seems to offer no
real distinguishing qualities from litigation, 194 other than being less
structured and less predictable.195 The arbitration process and the courts will
be more efficient if the Supreme Court can prevent potential arbitrating
parties from making their decision to contract for arbitration dependent upon
the availability to contract for a higher standard of review.
This Comment's proposal achieves this end by advocating a dynamic,
case-by-case, consideration of the issue. The proposal dangles freedom to
contract for expanded judicial review as an incentive to arbitrate, while
simultaneously advocating its disappearance, if policy or other contractual
impediments justify.

190. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
191. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 560 (writing that arbitration may become "just

another step in the litigation process"). See also Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super
Prod. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (commenting that a more searching review of
arbitration awards pursuant to an error of law standard could arguably convert arbitration
from a "commercially useful alternative method of dispute resolution into a burdensome
additional step on the march through the court system"). Contra LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891
(Kozinski, J. concurring). In LaPine I, Judge Kozinski stated:
I would call the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge
would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.
Given the strong public policy of party empowerment embodied in the Arbitration
Act, I see no reason why Congress would object to enforcement of this agreement.
Id.
See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: THE STORRS

LECTURES DELIVERED AT YALE UNIVERSITY 120 (1921) (instructing the reader that a
good judge should "shape his judgment of the law in obedience to the same aims" of the
Legislature considering the issue).
192. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 511. "Expansion of judicial review will threaten the
integrity of the arbitration process." Id.
193. Id. at 551-52.

194. Id. at 559. "An arbitration agreement expanding judicial review... would permit
the dispute to get into court through the back door." Id
195. See Hayford and Peeples, supra note 151, at 416 (revealing skepticism towards
arbitration's longevity: "the profession of commercial arbitration indicates a certain
shallowness, a lack of substance that does not bode well for the ability of the process to
stand in the place of the state and federal judiciaries, especially in complex, high-stakes
disputes").
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The Court, therefore, is strongly cautioned to resist the temptation to
merely affirm the contractual expansionist circuits.' 96 Instead, it should
temper freedom of contract in the spirit of the Fils and LaPineII courts, thus
allowing for the contractual expansion to be defeated only in light of public
policy other contractual considerations. 97 But the Court should not let
public policy or jurisdictional issues swallow freedom of contract as did the
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and in some ways the Ninth Circuits. 98
On the other hand, affirming a holding similar to the contractually
cautious circuits, and wholly excluding freedom to contract for expanded
review, is inherently more dangerous than its converse.' 99 These circuits are,
in effect, choosing to ignore parties' rights to contractually design arbitration
when the entire process is inextricably dependent upon contract for its
survival. 200 Though these contractually cautious circuits maintain that they
are holding true to the intent of Congress to keep grounds for vacatur narrow,
their loyalty to this purported congressional intent leaves parties and the
courts with an oxymoronic impression of contract law. If the Supreme Court
affirms the wholesale denial of contractually expanded judicial review,
potential arbitrating parties that value a legally correct resolution of their
dispute in an arbitration setting might feel that arbitration is too risky for
their business.20 '

196. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (describing the reasoning behind the
holdings of the contractual expansionist courts).
197. Fils, 584 F. Supp. at 244.
198. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of the
contractually cautious circuits and how those courts allowed jurisdictional and public
policy arguments to overshadow critical basics of contract law).
199. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of the
contractually cautious circuits).
200. See Cynthia A. Murray, ContractualExpansion of the Scope of JudicialReview of
Arbitration Awards Under the FederalArbitration Act, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 633, 65556 (2002) (arguing that contractual expansion of judicial review should be enforced,
contrary to the holding of the Tenth Circuit). See also Anthony J. Jacob, Expanding
JudicialReview To Encourage Employers and Employees To Enter The Arbitration Arena,
30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1099, 1118 (1997) (commenting that the bargain between the
parties is the foundation of arbitration vitality). See generally Karon A. Sasser, Freedom
to Contractfor Expanded JudicialReview in Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV.
337, 347-350 (2000/2001) (describing the Fourth and Fifth Circuit's reasoning that
freedom to contract principles trump counter arguments on the issue of expansion of
judicial review under the FAA).
201. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 151, at 414. The commentators expressed the
practical considerations of the arbitration alternative:
The decision by business executives to utilize arbitration in lieu of permitting
commercial disputes to proceed to traditional litigation is based on an implicit riskreturn assessment. The risks of submitting one's business fortunes, a priori, to a
private system of adjudication, virtually immune from judicial interference or
usurpation are considerable. Commercial arbitration will continue to prosper only
for so long as it produces returns sufficient to outweigh the risks its adoption
entails.
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C. The FinalStep: EstablishingOnly a Presumption in
Favorof the Right to Contractfor Expanded JudicialReview
When the Supreme Court chooses a case to resolve the circuit split, the
proponent of the contractually expanded judicial review, usually the loser at
arbitration, should be allowed to argue for vacatur based on legal error on the
presumption that parties who agree to arbitrate disputes have the freedom to
contractually supplement the default statutory grounds for vacatur provided
in the FAA.2" 2 It is entirely possible that the loser at arbitration/proponent of
the expansion clause will not assert the expansion clause because the party is
unconfident in the prospects for vacatur on the legal merits. The Court
should then allow the opponent of the expansion clause, usually the winner
at arbitration, to cite a public policy, or a contractual defense, in order to
overcome this presumption, and thus prevent legal arguments before the
district court. 203 Of course it is entirely possible that this winning
party/opponent of the expansion clause will forego an attack on the
presumption because they are confident in the legal propriety of the
arbitratior's decision.
This proposed model will alleviate federal binding arbitration of the ill
effects that a hard and fast rule will have on arbitrating parties and ensure its
vitality as an alternative method of dispute resolution.

202. Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM.

REV. INT'L ARB.

225, 231 (1997). Rau agreed that labeling the narrow grounds for vacatur in the FAA as
"default" rules is appropriate:
By contrast, I have always thought that the principal purpose of § 10 of the FAA and for that matter, of equivalent provisions found in all modem arbitration laws is rather to insulate from parochial or intrusive judicial review awards that the
parties intended in the usual sense to be binding. That is, § 10 serves to assure the
parties to an arbitral proceeding that they need not fear an officious or meddlesome
inquiry into the merits which would impair the efficacy of the arbitral process for
them. But such a purpose has nothing at all, as far as I can see, to do with the
situation where the parties are eager to depart from the protective rule of § 10. It is
one thing to say that their awards must have legal currency in accordance with the
parties' presumed wishes - it is something totally different to say that their awards
will have this currency, by God, over the parties' expressed wishes to the contrary.
I should think that such interference with private autonomy would have to be
justified - and on other than paternalistic grounds.
Id

203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: HOW AN EVENT MAY BE MADE A
§ 226 (1979) (detailing the law pertaining to an event as a condition in a

CONDITION

contract). See also Robert Childres, Conditions In the Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.U. L.

33 (1970) (reviewing case law that enforces both express conditions in a contract and
those conditions that are material to the contract). In addition to the illegality/severability
defense from LaPine II, the argument that expanded judicial review of an arbitration
award for errors in law was not a condition on which the underlying contract to arbitrate
was based might be a contractual defense to overcome a proposed presumption in favor of
freedom to contract for expanded judicial review. Id.
REV.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The future of federal binding arbitration under the FAA is at a critical
juncture, and the issue at hand is potentially crippling to the arbitration
process itself.204 Short of a congressional amendment to the FAA, only the
Supreme Court can preserve both the policies behind the FAA and the
expectations of parties who consider arbitration in lieu of litigation.20 5
The Supreme Court has instructed the legal community that, "Some
[problems] will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking
at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate
that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem., 20 6 This article's proposal is tailored to satisfy such a
conundrum and will prevent potential arbitrating parties, who desire a legally
sound outcome, from abandoning the arbitration alternative altogether, while
at the same time preserving the congressional intent to place the arbitration
contract on equal footing with other contracts.

204. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 151, at 415 (noting that there are now "viable

alternatives" to arbitration).
205. Id.at 414. The commentators chastised the arbitration process for not living up to
its billing:
It would be a most egregious error and the height of vanity for the champions of
commercial arbitration to believe that the courts... will stand idly by if, over time,
arbitration fails to provide the parties that employ it with a dispute resolution
mechanism that is cost effective, procedurally consistent, and fair, and capable.
Id.

206. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
But see Sullivan, supra note 9, at 555 (arguing that the issue of contractually expanded
judicial review calls for no such judicial inventiveness, as the FAA expressly forbids such
expansion).

